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I. 
It might come as a surprise for someone who has only a superficial knowledge of Donald 
Davidson’s philosophy that he has claimed literary language to be ‘a prime test of the 
adequacy of any view on the nature of language’.1 The claim, however, captures well the 
transformation that has happened in Davidson’s thinking on language since he began in 
the 1960’s to develop a truth-conditional semantic theory for natural languages in the 
lines of Alfred Tarski’s semantic conception of truth. About twenty years afterwards, this 
project was replaced with a view that highlights the flexible nature of language and, in 
consequence, the importance of the speaker’s intentions for a theory of meaning, 
culminating in Davidson’s staggering claim that ‘there is no such thing as a language’.2  
In insisting on the close relationship between intention and meaning, Davidson’s 
concerns clearly overlap with recent Anglo-American aesthetics where one of the hottest 
debates has involved the question of the relevance of the author’s intentions for the 
meaning of her work. Despite these similar concerns Davidson’s work is, strangely, 
barely cited. This essay exp lores that relationship and presents the claim that Davidson’s 
views on the relationship between meaning and intention are in decisive ways different 
from those supported by current modest intentionalists. The difference especially has to 
do with the role of conventions and where the limits of intending something lie, and at the 
                                                 
1  Davidson (2005/1993): 167. 
2  Davidson (2005/1986): 107. 
KALLE PUOLAKKA 
 16 
end of the essay, I will argue that these discrepancies might have a substantial effect on 
the intentionalist debate as a whole.     
Although Davidson does insist that language is a social art, he believes that explaining 
how it functions cannot be fully grasped by appealing to rule-governed conventions. 
After P.F. Strawson had argued against Bertrand Russell that logically proper names do 
not refer to anything by themselves, but people do by using them, it became popular to 
regard language as an enterprise governed by a different set of rules and conventions that 
the speaker and hearer mus t share in order for communication to succeed. The speaker 
was always seen as a part of some language game, and his intention to mean something 
was confined by its rules. This line of thinking is especially apparent in John Searle’s 
theory of speech acts, which, I believe, systematized the views that were implicitly 
present in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John L. Austin. 3 
Davidson finds it puzzling how this kind of view of language has sustained for so long 
even though it is countered by our frequent experience where the regularities and 
conventions of language are broken by novel uses of language and malapropisms, but in 
which we have no difficulties in understanding the intended meanings. If these kinds of 
cases are possible, how can language be exhaustively explained by appealing to 
conventions?4 Davidson believes that it cannot because ‘a deeper notion of what words, 
when spoken in context, mean’ is needed than conventions can offer.5 
For Davidson, the failure of the conventionalists can leave only the option that the 
speaker’s intention has to have a more prominent role in determining what expressions 
can mean in a language. But it is important to note that he does not think that the speaker 
can mean anything with his choice of words, because the hearer’s readiness to interpret 
the utterances must be taken into account. Intention to mean something and to be 
interpreted in a certain way are always connected to expectations, and the speaker must 
believe that his intended meaning can be understood. Merely intending to mean, 
                                                 
3  Searle’s account of the relationship between intention, meaning, and conventions captures this 
particular view of the language user: ‘The intention will in general be achieved if the hearer understands the 
sense, i.e., knows its meaning, i.e., knows the rules governing its elements’ (Searle 1969, p. 48).  
4  As an example Davidson uses the peculiar way in which radio sitcom writer Goodman Ace both talked 
and wrote. He insists that this kind of language use happens ‘all the time’, and that it is in fact ‘ubiquitous’ 
because of which philosophers should not play down its relevance for philosophy. (Davidson 2005/1986, p. 
89).  
5  Ibid.: 91. 
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therefore, does not guarantee that the expression will mean what it was intended to mean, 
but ‘you can change the meaning provided you believe… that the interpreter has adequate 
clues for the new interpretation’.6 Analogously, if I had believed that the intended 
meaning couldn’t be achieved, I would not have uttered the words I did, because they 
could not have had the intended meaning in that particular context.  
The reason why conventions, at the end, fail is that they cannot capture the unique 
and novel features, which are involved in determining what words can mean in a 
particular context as uttered by a particular speaker. Mediating conventions cannot 
regularize the possibility of understanding; in many cases it is achieved ‘by wit, luck, and 
wisdom’.7 For these reasons, ‘the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by an 
appeal to conventions’ should be abandoned.8 Conventions cannot have the kind of 
constraining force on intending as has been believed. This is also something, I believe, 
certain forms of modest intentionalism have also overlooked. 
 
II. 
The recent debate over intention in aesthetics could be structured around the different 
theories supported such as actual and hypothetical intentionalism, but it can also be 
approached through a literary figure, namely Humpty Dumpty. He is, of course, a figure 
in Lewis Carroll’s Alice story Through the Looking Glass, in which he claims to Alice, 
who wonders what Humpty’s expressions mean, that when he uses a word it means what 
he intends it to mean. This is Humpty-Dumpty- ism. Philosophers, however, have 
considered Humpty’s claim impossible, and he has been regarded as ‘a monster of private 
language’.9 
Humpty appears everywhere in the intentionalist debate. Already Beardsley referred to 
him and the example was one of the reasons why he ended supporting anti-
intentionalism: the thesis that intentions are irrelevant for the meaning of the work.10 
Nowadays, only a few truly support Beardsley anymore, but some form of intentionalism 
                                                 
6  Ibid.: 98. 
7    Ibid.: 107.  
8  Ibid. 
9  Hancher (1981): 49. 
10  Cf. Beardsley (1981). 
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has emerged as the most supported theory. Some kind of extra-textual intentional agent 
has been considered a necessary precondition for meaning.  
Three different intentionalist theories can be abstracted from the current debate. 
Absolute intentionalism insists that the meaning is wholly determined by the author’s 
intention, and recently one of its supporters, William Irwin, has explicitly stated that if 
Humpty had the intention to mean ‘there’s a nice knockdown argument for you’ with 
‘there’s glory for you’, the utterance truly meant that.11 Humpty Dumpty-ism isn’t a 
problem for him. This thesis, however, is not widely shared, but most of the participants 
in the debate seem to acknowledge that there must be a certain gap between what is 
intended and what the text ends up meaning. There must be a logical possibility for the 
intention to fail.  
The importance of this distinction is insisted especially in hypothetical intentionalism 
developed by Jerrold Levinson in recent years. Gary Iseminger, an actual intentionalist 
himself, thinks that the main reason why Levinson supports this view over more 
traditional intentionalism is the threat of Humpty Dumpty- ism.12 As Levinson himself 
says, intention to mean something must have constraints because both ‘writer and reader 
are bound’ by ‘shared knowledge of traditions, oeuvres, writerly identities, and the 
like’.13 By identifying work meaning as the best hypothesis made by an appropriately 
informed audience, Levinson’s view clearly manages to sustain the gap, but I think he has 
slightly overlooked that the challenge of Humpty Dumpty has also been taken seriously 
by those who support moderate or modest actual intentionalism, which is the most widely 
supported theory in the debate. If this challenge were to be met, there might be no reason 
for supporting hypothetical intentionalism.  
Modest intentionalism considers that the actual intentions of the author are relevant for 
the meaning of the work, but the epithet ‘modest’ implies that the text or work cannot 
mean whatever the author wants it to mean. Paisley Livingston spells this out by claiming 
‘some (but not all) artist’s semantic and other intentions are relevant, even necessary, to 
                                                 
11  Cf. Irwin (2000): 56-57. 
12  Cf. Iseminger (1996): 323. 
13  Levinson (1996): 184. 
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some (but not all) valuable interpretive insights because such intentions are sometimes 
constitutive of the work’s content’.14 
Modest intentionalists support their theory because they are dissatisfied with all the 
others. Anti- intentionalism neglects the meaning constitutive role of the author’s 
intention, whereas by debunking the author’s actual intentions hypothetical 
intentionalism cannot make the work’s meaning determinate enough for fruitful criticism. 
Modest intentionalists believe that both problems can be overcome by appealing to the 
real or actual intentions of the author, not to hypothetical constructions of them, but at the 
same time it does not lead to Humpty Dumpty- ism like absolute intentionalism. 15 This is 
because modest intentionalism insists that there must be some constraints on what can be 
intended. 
But what are the constraints? Livingston has argued that the intention has to be within 
‘natural and logical limits’, meaning that the intention to mean something might fail if it 
is impossible to convey the intended meaning with that particular choice of words.16 But 
what are these limits based on? Noël Carroll has insisted on the constraining force of the 
conventions of language and literature, and that the intention must be supported by the 
structure of the text.17 If the work’s structure is incompatible with the intention, the 
intention has failed, and the work does not mean what the author intended.  
There is, therefore, no reason to support hypothetical intentionalism because modest 
intentionalism can keep the cake and eat it too. It can acknowledge the relevance of the 
author’s actual intention and make the work’s meaning determinate enough, but at the 
same time, it does not fall into Humpty Dumpty-ism, because the intentions are 
constrained by the possible meanings utterances can have in a language. Carroll states 
this himself clearly: 
 
Modest actual intentionalism blocks Humpty Dumpty –ism because even if Humpty 
Dumpty intends ‘glory’ to mean ‘knockdown argument’, that is not a meaning that the 
textual unit (‘glory’) can have. The intentions of authors that the modest actual 
intentionalist takes seriously are only those intentions of the author that the 
linguistic/literary unit can support (given the conventions of language and literature).18 
                                                 
14  Livingston (1996): 627. 
15  Cf. Livingston (1996); and Iseminger (1996). 
16  Livingston (1998): 844. 
17  Carroll (2001/2000). 
18  Ibid.: 198. 
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So, Livingston and Carroll have introduced two constraints: the former believes 
intentions must be in certain limits, and the latter believes that these are given by the 
conventions of language and literature. Now, it is time to see, do Davidson’s views have 
something to offer.  
 
III. 
On the face of it, there does not seem to be a huge difference between Davidson and 
modest intentionalism; intention is relevant, but one cannot mean what one likes. There, 
however, is a slight, but at the end, significant difference, because, I believe, Davidson’s 
argument against the rule-governed nature of language also undermines both Livingston’s 
and Carroll’s arguments: conventions cannot have the kind of constraining force as they 
suggest. There must be limits on what can be meant but when analysed more fully what 
these are, at the end, based on, some interesting points emerge concerning the difference 
between hypothetical and modest intentionalism. Again, Humpty Dumpty can be used to 
illuminate the point. 
The deep difference between Davidson and both Carroll and Livingston is that his 
theory implies that there can be neither logical nor natural limits that would give the 
reasons why it would be impossible to mean ‘knockdown argument’ with ‘glory’. But 
despite of this allowance it does not fall into Humpty Dumpty-ism. How is this possible? 
According to Samuel Wheeler, Davidson would conclude that in the case at hand, 
Humpty’s utterance could not have meant what he intended, but there is no reason to 
think that this was because of the conventions of language as Carroll thinks. In this case, 
Carroll arrived at the right conclusion, but for the wrong reasons, because the reason why 
Humpty could not have meant what he intended was that Alice had no way of 
understanding the intended meaning, not because conventions constrain what can be 
meant. In different circumstances the result could have been different.19 
Humpty’s failure, therefore, was not that he broke the rules of the language game but 
something Davidson calls ‘the requirement of interpretability’: the speaker must make 
himself interpretable in such a way that it is possible for the hearer to make the intended 
                                                 
19  Wheeler (2003): 201. 
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interpretation. Humpty’s utterance was meaningless, because Alice had no possibility of 
achieving the intended interpretation, not because the conventions of language could not 
give ‘the textual unit’ the intended meaning. 
Now we approach Davidson’s views on literary language in which the relevance of 
intention is a crucial component, because it highlights the creative potentials of language.  
However, since intention to mean something always carries with itself a reference to the 
hearer’s or reader’s possibility of understanding, meaning in literature involves a certain 
interaction between author and reader. The author cannot ignore how the reader is 
prepared to interpret his utterances because the intention to mean something must be 
formed through the possibility that it can be interpreted in the intended way. The 
intention must be reasonable, but, of course, in literary contexts the author’s knowledge 
of the reader’s readiness to interpret his utterances cannot be as specific as in ordinary 
communicative situations.20  
Davidson is as sceptic about the role of conventions in the case of literature as in 
ordinary communication; there is no reason to presuppose the existence of shared 
conventions with a detailed content on which the author could rely in order to get his 
intention to mean something succeed. But, analogously, this means that conventions and 
past usages cannot restrict what can be meant, as Carroll seems to argue. As Wheeler puts 
it, ‘the effect of ‘rules’ is achieved just by mutual expectations [of the author and reader], 
together with the intent to communicate’.21 Conventions do not pose restrictions on what 
can be meant and past usage cannot fully govern present meanings, but only the clues that 
the author must give in order to make his writings interpretable for the reader. This is, 
again, the requirement of interpretability, and in literature, the possibility of interpretation 
might involve highly unique things that no convention can embrace or govern. According 
to Davidson, this is especially true of James Joyce: 
 
Joyce draws on every resource his readers command (or that he hopes they command, or 
thinks they should command), every linguistic resource, knowledge history, geography, 
past writers, and styles. He forces us both to look at and listen to his words to find the puns 
and fathom the references.22 
 
                                                 
20  Davidson (2005/1989): 147. 
21  Wheeler (2003): 199. 
22  Davidson (2005/1989): 147. 
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Davidson sees a similarity between James Joyce and Humpty Dumpty; both were 
innovators of language but unlike the later, Joyce gave subtle often hard to get clues as to 
how his utterances should be interpreted. Humpty, on the other hand, was an unsuccessful 
innovator because he did not give the required clues.  He was not an innovator because 
his utterances were not meaningful language. But, ‘it’s clear that when Joyce was flying 
by the net of language, he did not intend to leave us entangled’.23 As the longer quote 
shows, often the disentanglement involves highly delicate and unique bits of knowledge 
and since these clues are hard to dig up ‘as much is demanded from the reader as of the 
author…. By fragmentating familiar languages and recycling the raw material Joyce 
provokes the reader into involuntary collaboration’. 24  
Joyce’s works shoot us into a ‘verbal exile’, but if it is accepted that the result of the 
collaboration is meaningful language, it is strange what Livingston means by his 
contention that the intention has to be ‘in natural and logical limits’. Is Joyce’s language 
in these limits? And if it is, what does this mean? On what is this naturalness and 
logicalness based on? But it is even more likely that Carroll’s insistence on the Humpty 
Dumpty case cannot be adequate because if we believe Davidson, the reason why 
Humpty could not have meant what he intended was not the reason given by Carroll. 
Conventions cannot restrict intention in this way because in that case it might even be 
difficult to explain how Joyce’s prose can be meaningful.  
About twenty-five years ago, Michael Hancher noted that in ‘the age of Saussure and 
Wittgenstein’ Humpty Dumpty is left alone without ‘real allies’.25 At the age of 
Davidson, his case would at least have a hearing, and the reasons why he should have one 
will have implications for the current debate over intention.  
For modest intentionalism, I believe, it implies that its supporters should pay more 
attention where the limits of meaning something truly lie (Livingston), and what kind of 
intentions should be taken ‘seriously’ (Carroll). Davidson’s theory shows that 
conventions or talk of abstract limits clearly cannot do the required job. The question of 
these limits, however, is essential, because the attempt to sustain the gap between what is 
intended and what the work ends up meaning is the most important difference between 
                                                 
23  Ibid.: 153. 
24  Ibid.: 156-157. 
25  Hancher (1981): 50. 
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modest intentionalism and its absolute brother; a difference that is considered highly 
important by its supporters. The kinds of reasons given by Livingston and Carroll cannot, 
however, be the adequa te means for sustaining the gap.   
Since Davidson did not fall into Humpty-Dumpty- ism, there, of course, remains the 
possibility of elaborating his ideas into a version of modest intentionalism.  In this case, 
the important fact to note, however, is that for Davidson the possibility of intending a 
certain meaning always involves the hearer’s or reader’s possibilities of understanding. 
Modest intentionalists argued that there is no reason to support hypothetical 
intentionalism, because it can avoid Humpty Dumpty- ism by setting limits on what can 
be meant. This implies that in interpretive disputes a supporter of modest intentionalism 
must be able to prove that something could, in fact, have been meant. Merely intending to 
mean something does not guarantee that the end result will mean what it was intended to 
mean, so you must give good reasons for believing in the successfulness of the intention. 
But the Davidsonian perspective seems to argue that in order to show this, the modest 
intentionalist must rely on similar evidence than what hypothetical intentionalism 
considers relevant – ‘shared knowledge of traditions, oeuvres, writerly identities, and the 
like’.26 Perhaps Livingston was right to insist on ‘logical and natural limits’, but 
overlooked that, at the end, these limits consist of something the author and audience 
must share and that in many cases, it involves something highly unique that is not 
accounted for by the conventions of language and literature to which Carroll referred. As 
Wheeler stated above, it is more a matter of mutual expectations than conventions. 
 This would be Davidsonian modest intentionalism. But if my characterization of it, 
where the audience plays a crucial role, is accepted, will there any longer be a significant 
difference between modest and hypothetical intentionalism? This is a question I cannot 
pursue here in more detail, but I believe that when pressed far enough the whole debate 
might truly turn out to be ‘spurious’, as Peter Lamarque has argued, because in practice 
modest actual intentionalism ‘collapses into hypothetical intentionalism’.27 
                                                 
26  Levinson (1996): 184. 
27  Lamarque (2004): 7. 
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